FRACTIONAL FLOW

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Archive for the ‘debt’ Category

Will growing Costs of new Oil Supplies knock against declining Consumers’ Affordability?

In this post I present developments in world crude oil (including condensates) supplies since January 2007 and per June 2016. Further a closer look at petroleum demand (consumption and stock changes) developments in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for the same period and what this implies about demand developments in non OECD.

The data used for this analysis comes from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) Monthly Energy Review.

  • The OECD has about half of total global petroleum consumption.
  • Since December 2015 OECD total annualized petroleum consumption has grown about 0.2 Mb/d [0.5%].
    [Primarily led by growth in US gasoline and kerosene consumption, ref also figure 6.]
  • The OECD petroleum stock building was about 0.4 Mb/d during Jan-16 – Jun-16, which is a decline of about 0.6 Mb/d from the same period in 2015. This implies a 2016YTD net decline in total OECD demand of 0.4 Mb/d.
  • World crude oil supplies, according to EIA data, have declined 1.3 Mb/d from December-15 to June-16, ref figures 1 and 2.
  • The above implies that non OECD crude oil consumption/demand has declined about 1 Mb/d since December 2015.
    This while the oil price [Brent Spot] averaged about $40/b.

This may now have (mainly) 2 explanations;

  1. The present EIA data for crude oil for the recent months under reports actual world crude oil supply, thus the supply data for 2016 should be expected to be subject to upward revisions in the future.
  2. Consumption/demand in some non OECD regions/countries are in decline and this with an oil price below $50/b.
    If this should be the case, then it needs a lot of attention as it may be a vital sign of undertows driving world oil demand.
    Oil is priced in US$ and US monetary policies (the FED) affect the exchange rate for other countries that in addition have a portion of their debts denominated in US$ thus their oil consumption is also subject to the ebb and flows from exchange rate changes.

Figure 1: The stacked areas in the chart above shows changes to crude oil supplies split with North America [North America = Canada + Mexico + US], OPEC and other non OPEC [Other non OPEC = World - (OPEC + North America)] with January 2007 as a baseline and per June 2016. Developments in the oil price (Brent spot, black line) are shown against the left axis.

Figure 1: The stacked areas in the chart above shows changes to crude oil supplies split with North America [North America = Canada + Mexico + US], OPEC and other non OPEC [Other non OPEC = World – (OPEC + North America)] with January 2007 as a baseline and per June 2016. Developments in the oil price (Brent spot, black line) are shown against the left axis.

It was the oil companies’ rapid growth in debt [ref US Light Tight Oil (LTO)] that brought about a situation where supplies ran ahead of consumption and brought the oil price down.

YTD 2016, only OPEC has shown growth in crude oil supplies relative to 2015.

Unit costs ($/b) to bring new oil supplies to the market is on a general upward trajectory while the consumers’ affordability threshold may be in general decline.

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Oil, Interest Rates and Debt

At first glance it is hard to see how oil, interest rates and debt are connected. Two of them are human constructs while oil (fossil sunlight), a gift from Mother Nature, took tens of millions of years to process. Oil is an endowment extracted from a confined underground stock and is now the most dense and versatile energy source known to man.

Figure 1: Chart that shows the development of [extraction] cost of oil and interest rates (US 10 Year Treasuries) has developed since 2000 and a likely trajectory for oil extraction costs.

Figure 1: Chart that shows the development of [extraction] cost of oil and interest rates (US 10 Year Treasuries) has developed since 2000 and a likely trajectory for oil extraction costs.

Both lines are SIGNALS, and most likely plan their future based on only one of them.

The 10 Year Treasury (or similar) rate is the reference used for amongst other things to set interest rate for mortgages. Most now, aware of it or not, base their future plans on the expectations to developments of the 10 Year Treasury.

What is now playing out in the oil market may be described as below;

Low interest rates [stimulates debt growth] => Pulls demand forward => Oversupply => Deflation

How will the interest rate develop in the future?

This is important as the present huge global debt overhang weighs heavily in the consumers’ balance sheets and their affordability for costlier oil. It is also important for oil companies’ long term planning to bring costlier oil to the market.

A lasting, low rate makes higher debt loads manageable. Interest rates works both sides of the demand/supply equation.

A higher interest rate will have serious implications for highly leveraged consumers and oil companies.

The dynamics may be described as below:

Higher interest rate => lowers demand => downward pressure on price [deflation] => makes it harder for [highly leveraged] consumers/oil companies to service their debt overhang => lowers investments to develop costlier supplies

At some point in time the present oil supply overhang will come to an end. This will become reflected in a higher price.

The timing of these events creates uncertainties and the agile and financial strong oil companies will sweat out a lasting low oil price.

Few are aware of that the costs of accessing our real capital (like oil) that runs our economies are rapidly increasing.

What is different this time is that the oil price may remain lower for longer than the estimated full cycle break even costs for new developments.

The suggested path for costs is believed in the near term to come down as oil service companies have reduced their prices to shoulder the burden from the recent price collapse. Over time, the capacities of the service companies will become aligned with the demand for their services and products. At some point, as the oil price recovers and investments pick up, the market mechanisms will bring the prices from the service companies up as the service companies also need to make a profit to stay in business.

In figures 4 and 5 are shown how the combination of lower interest rates and a lasting, high oil price encouraged the oil companies to rapidly take on more debt to develop costlier oil on the expectations that consumers had remaining ability to take on more debt/credit to pay for this, thus allowing the oil companies to retire their debts.

The oil companies’ behavior in the recent decade is reminiscent of group think. Few expected the oil price to collapse, though the oil industry itself repeatedly point out the cyclical nature of the oil price.

The aggregate of developments (primarily driven by an amazing growth in the extraction of light tight oil [LTO]) gradually resulted in a supply overhang that made the oil price collapse.

The costs of extracting real capital, like oil, has been rapidly increasing, yet we are making decisions for the future as if it were decreasing, based on the price of capital (money). This is a short term phenomenon that will last until supply and demand become balanced.

The present situation with an apparent oil glut and low prices is a temporary false signal.

This may also be the case with the low interest rates.

The near future will reveal how the competition for available funds to service a still growing huge global debt overhang fare towards the need to fund developments of costlier oil.

Can an increasingly leveraged global economy handle both higher oil prices and interest rates and still remain on its growth trajectory?

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The Bakken LTO extraction in Retrospect and a Forecast of Near Future Developments

In retrospect, it becomes easier to understand the amazing growth and resilience of Light Tight Oil (LTO) extraction from Bakken (and other US tight oil plays) if the effects from the use of huge amounts of debts (including assets and equities sales) is put into this context.

Debt leverage together with a high oil price are what stimulated the US LTO extraction for some time to appear as something like a license to print money.

Now, and as long present low oil prices persist, the LTO companies are in financial straitjackets.

  • It was high CAPEX in 2015 from external funding, primarily debt and assets/equities sales, that created the impression of LTO’s resilience to lower oil prices (ref also figure 2).
    Actual data show that so far there has been some improvements in well productivities [cumulative versus time]. However, these improvements by themselves do not fully explain the apparent resilience of LTO extraction to lower oil prices.
  • NONE of the wells now added in the Bakken are on trajectories to become profitable at present prices (ref also figure 3).
    The average well now needs about $80/bo at the wellhead to be on a profitable trajectory.
    (The average spread between WTI and North Dakota Sweet has been and is above $10/bo.)
  • As far as actual data from NDIC on well productivity (EUR trajectories) provide any guidance it is not expected that well manufacturing will pick up in a meaningful way before the oil price moves and remains above $60/bo @ WH.

Writing down the drilling cost and rebasing profitability from completion costs [for DUCs, Drilled UnCompleted wells] does not change this fact.

  • The decline in the LTO extraction will (all things equal) relentlessly erode future funding capacities for drilling and completion [well manufacturing].
  • It is now all about the net cash flow from operations, debt service and retirement of debts [clearing the bond hurdles]. Debt management and debt restructuring will remain on top of the agenda for management of LTO companies. It should be expected that the management of these companies will do everything in their powers to clear the bond hurdles and keep their companies out of bankruptcy.
  • For 2016 well additions in the Bakken will fall below the threshold that allows to fully replace extracted reserves.
    In the industry this is referred to as the Reserves Replacement Ratio (RRR).
    For the Bakken the RRR for 2016 is now expected to be below 50%.
    (This lowers the collateral of the LTO companies and their debt carrying capacities.)

At present prices several companies cannot both retire their debts according to present redemption profiles and manufacture a lot of wells. This is why it is suspected that halting all drilling (where feasible [i.e. Contracts without stiff penalties for cancellation]) and deferring completions have become a necessity born out of the requirements for debt management.

This analysis presents:

  • A forecast on total LTO extraction for Bakken (ND, MB/TF) towards the end of 2017.
  • A closer look at a generic LTO company in Bakken and its near future challenges with clearing the bond hurdles.
    (The generic LTO company is based on [weighted] financial data from several, primarily Bakken invested companies’ Security and Exchange Commissions (SEC) 10-K/Q filings for 2015).
    To keep the focus on the (debt) dynamics in play, The Financial Red Queen, I opted to use a generic company. This is also done to play down discussions about specific companies.
  • The important message to drive home is how declining cash flow from operations, the big debt overhang and clearing the bond hurdles will constrain many LTO companies’ funding (CAPEX) for well manufacturing [drilling and/or completion] as long as oil prices remain below $60/bo @WH (or about $70/bo, WTI).

Figure 1: The chart above show actual LTO extraction from Bakken (ND, MB/TF) [green area], the funding constrained forecast towards end 2017 [grey area] and how LTO extraction is forecast to develop if no producing wells were added post Jan-16 [black dotted line].

Figure 1: The chart above show actual LTO extraction from Bakken (ND, MB/TF) [green area], the funding constrained forecast towards end 2017 [grey area] and how LTO extraction is forecast to develop if no producing wells were added post Jan-16 [black dotted line].

The companies operating in Bakken come in many sizes and business models and some of the majors (or subsidiaries thereof) likely have bigger financial muscles, lower debt costs (interest rates) and may have somewhat lower specific costs due to scale of operations.

  • With sustained low oil prices, the servicing of total debt has been and will be the power that forces companies deep in debt and heavily exposed to LTO into bankruptcies and causes losses on creditors and become the real driver behind the steep decline in LTO extraction.

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Written by Rune Likvern

Wednesday, 6 April, 2016 at 21:51

The Oil Price – Some (Mar-16) Observations and Thoughts

In this post I present some selected parameters I monitor which may help understand near term (2-3 years) oil price movements and levels.

It has been my understanding for some time that the formulations of fiscal and monetary policies also affects the commodities markets. Changes to total global debt has and will continue to affect consumers’/societies’ affordability and thus also the price formation of oil.

I have earlier asserted;

Any forecasts of oil (and gas) demand/supplies and oil price trajectories are NOT very helpful if they do not incorporate forecasts for changes to total global credit/debt, interest rates and developments to consumers’/societies’ affordability.

  • The permanence of the global supply overhang could be prolonged if consumption/demand developments soften/weakens and it is not possible to rule out a near term decline.
  • Recent demand/consumption data for total US petroleum products supplied show signs of saturation which provides headwinds for any upwards movements in the oil price.
  • While prices were high many oil companies went deeper into debt in a bid to increase production of costlier oil. Many responded to the price collapse with attempts to sustain/grow production in efforts to moderate cash flow declines and thus ease debt service.
  • If the forward [futures] curve moves from a present weak contango (ref also figure 02) to backwardation, this would erode support for the oil price.
  • Some suggest that growth from India will take over as China’s growth slows.
    Looking at the data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) there is nothing there that now suggests India (refer also figure 05) has started to accelerate its debt expansion. The Indian Rupee has depreciated versus the US dollar, thus offsetting some of the stimulative consumption effects from a lower oil price.

The recent weeks oil price volatility has likely been influenced by several factors like short squeezes, rumors and fluid sentiments.

Near term factors that likely will move the oil price higher.

  • Continued growth in debt primarily in China and the US. {This will go on until it cannot!}
  • Another round with concerted efforts of the major central banks with lower interest rates and quantitative easing.

And/or

  • A tightening in the global oil demand/supply balance from whatever reasons.

I also believe that D E M A N D (consumption) developments now are more important than widely recognized and that demand/consumption developments will play a major factor in as from when oil prices will regain support to move to a sustainable higher level.

I now hold it 90% probable that the oil price will enter a new leg down, and that the low in January 2016 could be taken out.

Recently the total US petroleum demand growth had two components

  1. Growth in consumption, mainly driven by the collapse of the oil price
  2. Noticeable growth in petroleum stocks (primarily crude oil) since late 2014 driven by a favorable contango.

The combined effects from these grew annualized US petroleum demand by 1.3 Mb/d relative to January 2014 (ref also figure 01). US consumption growth has now stalled, which may suggest saturation from the lower oil price is about to be reached.

Figure 01: The chart above shows development in annualized [52 weeks moving averages] US total petroleum consumption [blue line] and storage build [red line] both rh scale. The black line, lh scale, shows development in the oil price (WTI). Consumption and storage developments are relative to Janaury 2014 (baseline). NOTE, changes in consumption and stocks are stacked, thus the red line also shows total annualized changes in demand.

Figure 01: The chart above shows development in annualized [52 weeks moving averages] US total petroleum consumption [blue line] and storage build [red line] both rh scale. The black line, lh scale, shows development in the oil price (WTI). Consumption and storage developments are relative to Janaury 2014 (baseline).
NOTE, changes in consumption and stocks are stacked, thus the red line also shows total annualized changes in demand.

In the last 6 months total US petroleum consumption developments have stalled and there are some relative changes amongst the products (ref below).

A weakened contango (ref also figure 02) will likely reduce demand for storage.

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The Oil Price and EMEs growth in Credit and Petroleum Consumption since 2000

In this post I present a closer look at the credit growth for 6 Emerging Market Economies (EME) together with the developments in their and the net oil exporters petroleum consumption for the period 2000 to 2014.

The 6 EMEs are; Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.

  • Where did the lion’s share of growth in global petroleum consumption end up since 2000?
  • What was the likely mechanism/vehicle that allowed for this?

This post is an update and expansion to my post “Changes in Total Global Credit Affect The Oil Price”

  • The credit growth for the EMEs was strong in absolute and relative terms (also as a percentage of GDP) since 2009. As from 2013 the EMEs credit growth slowed (decelerated).
  • The EMEs credit growth gained momentum as the big central banks lowered interest rates and started Quantitative Easings (QE), refer also figures 02 and 04.
  • As the EMEs enter debt saturation (little room left on their balance sheets {little remaining quality collateral} to take on more credit/debt) expect this to affect their consumption and their potential to pay for higher priced oil.
  • Potential for continued [global] credit growth will for some time become one of the vital factors that define the sustainable ceiling for the oil price.
  • Demand is what one can pay for. In other words, demand is monetary in nature. Credit acts as money and adds to aggregate demand.
    Credit growth also made it possible to bid up and pay for higher priced oil during the recent years.
  • If the oil price, for whatever combination of reasons, moves to a sustainable higher level, it should be expected that those who are left with limited/no access to more credit will reduce their consumption/demand for oil.

Figure 01: The stacked areas in the chart show the growth in petroleum consumption for the 6 EMEs and the net oil exporters from 2000 to 2014 [2000 has been used as a baseline]. Total growth for the 6 EMEs are shown by the black dotted line. The red dashed line shows the change in total global petroleum consumption since 2000. [These are shown versus the right axis]. The development in the oil price is shown by yellow circles connected by a grey line versus the left axis.

Figure 01: The stacked areas in the chart show the growth in petroleum consumption for the 6 EMEs and the net oil exporters from 2000 to 2014 [2000 has been used as a baseline]. Total growth for the 6 EMEs are shown by the black dotted line.
The red dashed line shows the change in total global petroleum consumption since 2000. [These are shown versus the right axis].
The development in the oil price is shown by yellow circles connected by a grey line versus the left axis.

The chart above shows several interesting developments.

  • The strong growth in petroleum consumption from the 6 EMEs and net oil exporters since 2000.
  • Early in the previous decade the OECD countries also grew their petroleum consumption as a response to central banks’ lowered interest rates that allowed for further credit expansion [kicking the can until there is no more road left].
  • A shift occurred post the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008.
    The 6 EMEs and net exporters outbid OECD (and others) for a portion of their petroleum consumption.
    (This is shown by the growth in global petroleum consumption [the red dotted line] which since 2008 did not fully meet growth in consumption from the 6 EMEs and net oil exporters.
    The 6 EMEs and the net oil exporters increased their total petroleum consumption with 17.1 Mb/d (from 26.7 Mb/d in 2000 to 43.7 Mb/d in 2014), while global consumption grew by 15.2 Mb/d to 92.1 Mb/d.
  • OECD reduced its petroleum consumption from 48.0 Mb/d (2008) to 45.1 Mb/d (2014).
    OECD countries slowed and/or reversed credit expansion (deleveraged [default is one way to deleverage]) and introduced austerity measures in a bid to manage their credit overhang.
  • The net oil exporters (countries/regions) that saw noticeable growth in their petroleum consumption in the period are; Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Norway, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan and the regions Middle East and Africa. There are other small net oil exporters like Denmark, Trinidad&Tobago which had small changes to their petroleum consumption.
  • Indonesia became a net petroleum importer as of 2003 and Malaysia as of 2011.

The net oil exporters spent some of the increased revenues from higher priced oil for social programs to improve living standards and as leverage for increased investments to sustain and/or grow oil supplies (which require energy!) for what looked like a sustained growth in demand/consumption that would support a lasting high oil price.

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Written by Rune Likvern

Saturday, 5 September, 2015 at 19:01

World Crude Oil Production and the Oil Price, August 2015

In this post I present some of my observations and thoughts about the developments in the oil price, supply and demand, exchange rates (relative to the US dollar), petroleum stocks and what near term factors are likely to influence the oil price.

  • The price of oil (and other commodities) appears to have been influenced by the central banks’ policies post the GFC of 2008 (Global Financial Crisis, primarily the Fed as the US dollar is the world’s major reserve currency) with low interest rates which allowed for growth in total global credit/debt.
  • As the Fed confirmed its end of QE3 (QE; Quantitative Easing) program by the fall of 2014, the oil price started to decline. This decline became amplified by an oversupply resulting from years of debt fueled high capital expenditures by the oil companies to develop supplies of costlier oil for the market to meet expectations of growth in consumption.
  • With the end of QE3 the US dollar rapidly appreciated versus most other major currencies, which offset some of the decline in the oil price in most economies (oil is priced in US dollar), the exceptions being the US and China (which has its currency pegged to the US dollar).
  • Demand and consumption of oil (actual data so far only for the US) responded to the price collapse by some growth. However the world’s growth has not been sufficient to close the gap between supplies and consumption, thus sustaining a downward pressure on the oil price.
  • The oil price collapse motivated oil companies with low variable costs (OPEX) to compensate some of the loss of cash flow by increasing their production (volumes), thus creating a dynamic where growing supplies went looking for demand.
  • The oil price collapse and a period with a favorable contango spread incentivized a strong build in stocks and as stocks remain at elevated levels, it may take some time before stocks return to “normal” levels.

Figure 1: The chart above shows the developments in the oil price [Brent spot, black line. The red line is the smoothed one year moving average] and the time of central banks’ announcements/deployments of available monetary tools to support the global financial markets which the economy relies heavily upon. The financial system is virtual and thus highly responsive. NOTE: The chart suggests some causation between FED policies and movements to the oil price. The US dollar is the world’s major reserve currency and most currencies are joined to it at the hip.

Figure 1: The chart above shows the developments in the oil price [Brent spot, black line. The red line is the smoothed one year moving average] and the time of central banks’ announcements/deployments of available monetary tools to support the global financial markets which the economy relies heavily upon. The financial system is virtual and thus highly responsive.
NOTE: The chart suggests some causation between FED policies and movements to the oil price. The US dollar is the world’s major reserve currency and most currencies are joined to it at the hip.

The big unknown is how demand will develop. A global economy struggling with too much debt while running out of quality collateral will at some point experience the drags from growth in the services of the growing total debt. Continued growth in global credit/debt will increasingly be directed towards the services of the growing total amount of debt (kicking the can down the road as the economic productivity from additional credit/debt diminishes).

  • As growth in global credit/debt slows, comes to halt or deleveraging sets in, this will affect demand and prices, also for oil.

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Are the Light Tight Oil (LTO) Companies trying to outsmart Mother Nature with their Financial Balance Sheets?

In this post I present what I found from applying R/P (Reserves divided by [annual] Production) ratios for Light Tight Oil (LTO) for 3 big companies in Bakken/Three Forks/Sanish.

The companies are; Continental Resources, Oasis Petroleum and Whiting Petroleum, which operated 28% of total LTO extraction in the Bakken(ND) in December 2014.

  • Undertaking oil and gas reserves assessments are just as much an art as a science.

From previous work with LTO from Bakken I kept track of the R/P ratio for wells/portfolios and generally found it was in the range of 3 – 4 after their first year of flow. This suggested that 25 – 35% of the wells’ Estimated Ultimate Recovery (EUR) was extracted in their first year of flow.

This made sense as extraction (production) from LTO wells are heavily front end loaded and have steep initial declines.

Examining some big Bakken companies SEC 10-K (SEC; Securities and Exchange Commission) filings for 2014 I noticed that these had R/P ratios for Proven Developed Reserves (PDP) that ranged from 7 – 9.

(Refer to the end of this post for more detailed explanations/definitions of PDP and PUD)

That did not make sense and R/P ratios give away powerful and very valuable information about likely future extraction trajectories.

About 50% of the companies’ total LTO extraction (flow) in Dec 2014 in Bakken (ND) were from wells started in 2014. In other words, the flow was dominated by “young” wells which decline rapidly. Therefore, whatever flow data (monthly, quarterly) that was annualized it should be expected a R/P ratio for total extraction around 4 for 2014.

What I present is how PDP, extraction data and R/P data derived from the 3 companies SEC 10-K statements compares to what was derived from actual data. Further, what actual data now is projecting for EUR for the average well for these companies.

Figure 1: The chart above shows developments in average well first year LTO totals (productivity) for some companies and by vintage. The colored columns for 2013 and 2015 show projected financial performance based on average well first year LTO totals. For 2013 the chart is based on: WTI at $98/b and a type well at $10M was found to have a 0% return with a total first year LTO flow at about  50 kb.  For 2015 the chart is based on: WTI at $60/b and a type well at $8M was found to have a 0% return with a total first year LTO flow at about 90 kb.  The chart illustrates that the well productivity has been on an upward trend. So far the productivity improvements and cost reductions have not fully compensated for the effects from a much lower oil price.  The profitability equation of the type well was solved for the equivalent total first year flow for various oil prices and costs on a point forward basis. A lower oil price makes the red columns “push” the other ones upwards (moves the profitability bands upwards). Wells of 2015 vintage (pre May) are on a trajectory close to those of the 2014 vintage. kb,  kilo barrels = 1,000 barrels

Figure 1: The chart above shows developments in average well first year LTO totals (productivity) for some companies and by vintage. The colored columns for 2013 and 2015 show projected financial performance based on average well first year LTO totals.
For 2013 the chart is based on: WTI at $98/b and a type well at $10M was found to have a 0% return with a total first year LTO flow at about 50 kb.
For 2015 the chart is based on: WTI at $60/b and a type well at $8M was found to have a 0% return with a total first year LTO flow at about 90 kb.
The chart illustrates that the well productivity has been on an upward trend. So far the productivity improvements and cost reductions have not fully compensated for the effects from a much lower oil price.
The profitability equation of the type well was solved for the equivalent total first year flow for various oil prices and costs on a point forward basis.
A lower oil price makes the red columns “push” the other ones upwards (moves the profitability bands upwards).
Wells of 2015 vintage (per May) are on a trajectory close to those of the 2014 vintage.
kb, kilo barrels = 1,000 barrels

LTO in Bakken will now generally work profitably with an oil price (WTI) above $80/b.

The willingness of several companies to sell more debt (obtain more credit), assets and equity to continue to manufacture LTO wells which estimates showed were not commercially viable have had many analysts puzzled.

Something was likely overlooked, and chances are that this is related to EUR driven incentives to expand assets/equity on the companies’ balance sheets (or “book to model”).

As companies drill wells and puts these in operation (production), it allows them to book reserves on the balance sheets. And reserves are the biggest portion of the LTO companies’ balance sheets.

The rush to use credit/debt to drill what likely would become unprofitable wells (applying project economics) with a lasting, low oil price appears driven by some perverse incentive to grow booked reserves to grow assets and thus equity on the companies’ balance sheets, overriding outlooks for poor profitability. High equity on the balance sheets allows for more debt.

Looking at actual, hard well data (from NDIC; North Dakota Industrial Commission) this strategy will at some point have to face up to the realities of physics and Nature. And physics and Nature do NOT negotiate.

  • Using actual data for LTO wells strongly suggests that the PDP (and thus PUD) estimates in companies’ SEC 10-K filings for 2014 are grossly inflated. If so, this has inflated the assets/equity numbers on the companies’ balance sheets.
  • The findings from this study suggest that the massive drilling activity funded by growing debt, was likely motivated by balance sheets expansions of assets, and thus the equity from inflated EUR numbers (“book to model”) which made room to take on more debt.
  • An inflated balance sheet that allows for a debt load above the carrying capacities of the real underlying collateral, will at some point in time turn against their creators and call for revisions of future plans and expectations.
  • It will be interesting to see how the LTO companies’ balance sheets and their profitability respond as it become Mother Nature’s turn with the bat.

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Written by Rune Likvern

Monday, 3 August, 2015 at 10:33

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