FRACTIONAL FLOW

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Archive for the ‘IEA’ Category

Status of Norwegian Natural Gas at end of 2015 and Forecasts towards 2025

In this post I present actual Norwegian natural gas production, status on reserves, the development in discoveries and what this results for Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and my expectations for the future delivery potential for Norwegian natural gas.

Norway, after Russia, has been and is the EU’s second biggest supplier of natural gas.

Norway is the third largest gas exporter in the world. In 2015, Norway exported about 114 Gcm (Bcm) gas, mainly to other countries in Europe.

Included is also a brief look at developments in actual consumption and production of natural gas in the 28 members of the European Union (the EU 28).

  • NPD in their most recent forecast further revised down and narrowed their band for future delivery potential with about 10 Gcm/a (Bcm/a) by 2025 and pushed forward the start of decline one year relative to their previous forecast.
  • I now expect the Norwegian delivery potential for natural gas relative to 2015 to decline by more than 40% by 2025.
  • Europe will increasingly have to rely on natural gas imports from more distant sources and should by now have defined policies for the role natural gas will have in its future energy mix.

This post is an update to my post in 2015 looking at the status as of end 2014.

Figure 1: The chart above shows development in natural gas exports from production installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) as reported by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) from 1996 to 2015 and with my forecast for delivery potential towards 2025. The chart also shows the band of NPD forecasts; green line upper projection, orange line lower projection. NPD’s central projection is in about the middle of the green and orange lines. The black dotted line is the forecast from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA WEO 2012). Numbers are believed to be gross exports from the production installations and thus not adjusted for “shrinkage” from Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) extraction, primarily at Kollsnes and Kårstø. The NGL extraction reduces total sales gas volumes with around 4% relative to what is exported from the producing installations. Numbers in Gcm, Giga cubic meters (Gcm = Bcm; Billion cubic meters)

Figure 1: The chart above shows development in natural gas exports from production installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) as reported by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) from 1996 to 2015 and with my forecast for delivery potential towards 2025.
The chart also shows the band of NPD forecasts; green line upper projection, orange line lower projection. NPD’s central projection is in about the middle of the green and orange lines.
The black dotted line is the forecast from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA WEO 2012).
Numbers are believed to be gross exports from the production installations and thus not adjusted for “shrinkage” from Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) extraction, primarily at Kollsnes and Kårstø. The NGL extraction reduces total sales gas volumes with around 4% relative to what is exported from the producing installations.
Numbers in Gcm, Giga cubic meters (Gcm = Bcm; Billion cubic meters)

My forecast  and NPD’s forecast at end 2015 are basically identical towards the end of this decade, but differs about the timing for the start of the decline and how steep this will become as from early next decade. My forecast is also tested versus the Reserves over Production (R/P) ratio as of end 2015, refer also figure 2.

At end 2015 the NPD projection of Norwegian natural gas supply potential towards 2025 was revised down.

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Status of Norwegian Natural Gas at end of 2014 and Forecasts towards 2025

In this post I present actual Norwegian natural gas production, status on reserves, the development in discoveries and what this results for Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and my expectations for the future delivery potential for Norwegian natural gas.

Norway, after Russia, has been and is the EU’s second biggest supplier of natural gas.

Included is also a brief look at developments in actual consumption and production of natural gas in the EU 28 (the 28 members of the European Union).

  • NPD revised down their band for future delivery potential by about 10 Gcm/a (Bcm/a) and moved the start of decline one year forward relative to their forecast last year.
  • I now expect the Norwegian delivery potential for natural gas relative to 2014/2015 to decline by more than 40% by 2025.
  • Europe will increasingly have to rely on natural gas imports from more distant sources and should by now have implemented policies for the role natural gas will have in its future energy mix.

This post is an update to my post in 2014 looking at the status as of end 2013.

Figure 1: The chart above shows development in natural gas exports from production installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) as reported by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) from 1996 to 2014 and with my forecast for delivery potential towards 2025. The chart also shows the NPD forecasts; green line upper projection, orange line lower projection. NPD’s central projection is in about the middle of the green and orange lines. The black dotted line is the forecast from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA WEO 2012). Numbers are believed to be gross exports from the production installations and thus not adjusted for “shrinkage” from Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) extraction, primarily at Kollsnes and Kårstø. The NGL extraction reduces total sales gas volumes with around 4% relative to what is exported from the producing installations. Numbers in Gcm, Giga cubic meters (Gcm = Bcm; Billion cubic meters)

Figure 1: The chart above shows development in natural gas exports from production installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) as reported by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) from 1996 to 2014 and with my forecast for delivery potential towards 2025.
The chart also shows the NPD forecasts; green line upper projection, orange line lower projection. NPD’s central projection is in about the middle of the green and orange lines.
The black dotted line is the forecast from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA WEO 2012).
Numbers are believed to be gross exports from the production installations and thus not adjusted for “shrinkage” from Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) extraction, primarily at Kollsnes and Kårstø. The NGL extraction reduces total sales gas volumes with around 4% relative to what is exported from the producing installations.
Numbers in Gcm, Giga cubic meters (Gcm = Bcm; Billion cubic meters)

My forecast  and NPD’s forecast at end 2014 are basically identical towards the end of this decade, but differs about the timing for the start of the decline and how steep this will become as from early next decade. My forecast is also tested versus the Reserves over Production (R/P) ratio as of end 2014, refer also figure 2.

At end 2014 the NPD projection of Norwegian natural gas supply potential towards 2025 was revised down.

NPD’s central projection is in about the middle of the green and orange lines. Note the span of uncertainties in the NPD’s forecast.

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Changes in Total Global Credit Affect The Oil Price

In some posts on Fractional Flow I have presented some of my explorations of any relations between the oil price, changes to global total credit/debt and interest rates. My objective has been to gain and share some of my insights of how I see the economic undertows that also influences the price formation for crude oil.

I have earlier asserted;

  • Any forecasts of oil (and gas) demand/supplies and oil price trajectories are NOT very helpful if they do not incorporate forecasts for changes to total global credit/debt, interest rates and developments to consumers’/societies’ affordability.

In this post I present results from an analysis of developments to the annual changes in total debt in the private, non financial sector of some Advanced Economies (AE’s), and 5 Emerging Economies (EME’s) from Q1 2000 and as of Q3 2014 with data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS in Basel, Switzerland).

The AE’s are: Euro area, Japan and the US.

The 5 EME’s are: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and Thailand which in the post are collectively referred to as “The 5 EME’s”.

Year over year (YOY) changes in total private debt for the analyzed economies were juxtaposed with YOY changes in total petroleum consumption in these based upon data from BP Statistical Review 2014.

  • As the AE’s slowed growth in, and/or deleveraged their total private debt after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008/2009, the EME’s continued their strong growth in total private debt and China accelerated it significantly in 2009.
  • The AE’s petroleum consumption declined noticeably as from 2007, resulting from the combination of high oil prices and tepid debt growth and/or deleveraging.
  • The EME’s remained defiant to high oil prices and continued their strong growth in petroleum consumption, which likely was made possible by strong growth in total private debt.
  • Demand remains what the consumers can pay for!

All debts counts, household, corporate, financial and public (both government and local) and exerts an influence on economic performance (GDP, Gross Domestic Product).

A low interest rate allows for growth in total debt and eases services of the growing total debt load.

Figure 01: The chart above shows the developments in the oil price [Brent spot, black line] and the time of central banks’ announcements/deployments of available monetary tools to support the global financial markets which the economy heavily relies upon. The financial system is virtual and thus highly responsive. NOTE: The chart suggests some causation between FED policies and movements to the oil price. The US dollar is the world’s major reserve currency and most currencies are joined to it at the hip.

Figure 01: The chart above shows the developments in the oil price [Brent spot, black line] and the time of central banks’ announcements/deployments of available monetary tools to support the global financial markets which the economy heavily relies upon. The financial system is virtual and thus highly responsive.
NOTE: The chart suggests some causation between FED policies and movements to the oil price. The US dollar is the world’s major reserve currency and most currencies are joined to it at the hip.

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World Crude Oil Production and the Oil Price

In April 2012 I published this post about World Crude Oil Production and the Oil Price (in Norwegian) which was an attempt to describe the developments in the sources of crude oils (including condensates), tranches of total life cycle costs (that is [CAPEX {inclusive returns} + OPEX] per barrel  of oil) and something about the drivers for the formation of the oil price.

Rereading the post and as time passed, I learnt more and therefore thought it appropriate to revisit and update the post as it in my opinion contains some topics from what I have observed, learned and discussed that have been given poor attention and appears poorly understood.

I will continue to pound the message that oil prices are also subject to the reality of;

  • “Demand is what the consumers can pay for!”

Figure 1: The chart above shows the developments in the oil price [Brent spot] and the time of central banks’ announcements/deployments of available tools to support the global financial markets which the economy heavily relies upon. The financial system is virtual and thus highly responsive. The chart suggests causation between FED policies and movements to the oil price.

Figure 1: The chart above shows the developments in the oil price [Brent spot] and the time of central banks’ announcements/deployments of available tools to support the global financial markets which the economy heavily relies upon. The financial system is virtual and thus highly responsive.
The chart suggests causation between FED policies and movements to the oil price.

The four big central banks, BoE, BoJ, ECB and the Fed expanded their balance sheets with $6 – 7 Trillion following the Lehman collapse in the fall of 2008. These liquidity injections are about to end.

Since 2008 most of the advanced economies’ credit expansions originated from the central banks, the lenders of last resort. Central banks are collateral constrained.

The consensus about the oil price collapse during the recent weeks is attributed to waning global demand and growth in  supplies.

All eyes are now on OPEC.

  • Any forecasts of oil (and gas) demand/supplies and oil price trajectories are NOT very helpful if they do not incorporate forecasts for changes to total global credit/debt, interest rates and developments to consumers’/societies’ affordability.

For more than a decade, I have carefully studied the forecasts (and been involved in numerous fruitful [private] discussions) from authoritative sources like the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) including the annual outlooks from several of the major oil companies and I did NOT find that any of these takes into consideration changes to global credit/debt [growth/deleveraging], levels of total global credit/debt and interest rates.

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Status of Norwegian Natural Gas and a Forecast towards 2025

In this post I present actual Norwegian natural gas production, status on reserves, the development in discoveries and what this results for my expectations for the future delivery potential for Norwegian natural gas.

Included is also a brief look at actual and forecast development for EU’s (+Norway) consumption and production of natural gas.

Norway is not a formal member of the European Union (EU).

This post is an update on my post back in March 2013 (in Norwegian).

Norway, after Russia, has been and is the EU’s second biggest supplier of natural gas. In Europe the outlook for natural gas supplies is followed with heightened interests following the recent developments in Ukraine and its ability to continue to afford Russian natural gas. A big portion of the  natural gas consumed by EU transits from Russia through Ukraine.

The potential for any interruptions to EU’s natural gas supplies has made EU consult other suppliers requesting these to have a look at their potentials to increase deliveries to offset any shortfalls to natural gas deliveries from Russia.

Fig 1 Norway actual as of 2013 and forecast natural gas production to 2025

Figure 1: The chart above shows development in natural gas exports from production installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) as reported by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) from 1996 to 2013 and with my forecast for delivery potential towards 2025. The chart also shows the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) forecasts; green line upper projection, orange line lower projection. The black dotted line is the forecast from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA WEO 2012). Numbers are believed to be gross exports from the production installations and thus not adjusted for “shrinkage” from Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) extraction, primarily at Kollsnes and Kårstø. The NGL extraction reduces total sales gas volumes with around 4% relative to what is exported from the production installations. Numbers in Giga cubic meters (Gcm = Bcm)

My forecast (developed in the spring of 2014) and the forecast from the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE) shows basically the same trends, but differs about the timing for the start of  the decline and how steep it will become. My forecast results in some kind of plateau towards the end of this decade followed by a steep decline, refer also figure 4.

I now expect the Norwegian delivery potential for natural gas to decline by 40 – 50% by 2025.

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NOEN INNTRYKK FRA BP STATISTICAL REVIEW 2013

Her følger noen utvalgte inntrykk fra BP Statistical Review 2013. BP sine årlige Statistical Review regnes som en av de mest autorative kildene for energidata og brukes mye som referanse.

Figur 01: Verdens utvikling i totalt energiforbruk for 1965 - 2012 splittet på energikilder.

Figur 01: Verdens utvikling i totalt energiforbruk for 1965 – 2012 splittet på energikilder.

Det globale energiforbruket viser fortsatt vekst også drevet av vekst i gjeld og nå primært fra fortsatt vekst i offentlig gjeld.

Energimarkedene er svært dynamiske der prisforskjeller mellom energikildene nå driver frem en raskere global vekst for kull blant de fossile energikildene.

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OM NORSK GASSUTVINNING PER 2012 OG PROGNOSE MOT 2020

I dette innlegget vil jeg presentere noe om historisk norsk gassutvinning og utvikling i funn og reserver og hva data fra Oljedirektoratet (OD) nå gir av forventninger til norsk gassproduksjon mot 2020.

Dette er en oppdatering og utvidelse av dette innlegget.

Figur 1: Figuren ovenfor viser den historiske utviklingen i norsk gassutvinning etter felt fra 1996 og til 2011 slik dette har blitt rapportert av OD. Figuren viser også en prognose (laget av forfatteren) for perioden 2013 og mot 2020. Prognosen omfatter alle produserende og besluttede felt og tar høyde for utvikling i R/P (Reserver dividert med Produksjon), ODs estimater for gjenværende utvinnbart, anleggsbegrensninger osv.Prognosen er ikke justert for redusert uttak fra årlig vedlikehold. Prognosen inkluderer ikke effekten fra nedstengning av felt ettersom disse blir ulønnsomme. I figuren er også vist utvinningsspennet ventet av Olje og Energidepartementet (OED) og en prognose fra IEA (International Energy Agency) mot 2020.

Figur 1: Figuren ovenfor viser den historiske utviklingen i norsk gassutvinning etter felt fra 1996 og til 2011 slik dette har blitt rapportert av OD. Figuren viser også en prognose (laget av forfatteren) for perioden 2013 og mot 2020. Prognosen omfatter alle produserende og besluttede felt og tar høyde for utvikling i R/P (Reserver dividert med Produksjon), ODs estimater for gjenværende utvinnbart, anleggsbegrensninger osv.
Prognosen er ikke justert for redusert uttak fra årlig vedlikehold.
Prognosen inkluderer ikke effekten fra nedstengning av felt ettersom disse blir ulønnsomme. I figuren er også vist utvinningsspennet ventet av Olje og Energidepartementet (OED) og en prognose fra IEA (International Energy Agency) mot 2020.

Norske gassleveranser for salg nådde en ny topp i 2012 etter at de falt noe fra 2010 til 2011. For perioden 2013 til 2015 ventes den norske gassutvinningen å befinne seg på hva som for alle praktiske formål vil være å betrakte som et platå.  Fra 2016 ventes potensialet for den norske gassutvinningen å falle og dette fallet vil kunne akselerere fra 2019.

I figur 1 har det bevisst blitt brukt begrepet potensial for å beskrive hva som kan ventes av totale leveranser om kjøperne skulle ønske det. Gassalgsavtalene har fleksibilitet som gir kjøperne anledning til å ta gass innenfor et avtalt spenn. Av den grunn bør det ventes at totalt potensial vil være noe høyere enn hva som faktisk blir solgt og levert.

Rundt 95 % av norsk salgsgass leveres gjennom rørledninger til kjøpere på kontinentet og Storbritannia og resten som LNG (Liquified Natural Gas; i hovedsak metan i væskeform).

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