Archive for the ‘OECD’ Category
As analysts and pundits keep staring into their crystal balls searching for clues to future moves in the oil price, it may be more helpful to look at some actual developments that may explain the recent strong US stock builds, developments in US total petroleum consumption and what this now may presage about future oil price movements.
In this post I present a closer look at the recent growth in US total petroleum demands split into:
- Development in US total petroleum consumption (inclusive some selected products)
- Rate of stock build of US commercial crude oil stocks
Then a look at developments in crude oil supplies from OPEC where several of the big oil producers in the Middle East have had strong growth in the number of oil rigs since early 2014. Recent media reports about increases in oil supplies from the biggest Middle East oil producer.In Q1 2014 the average daily US stock build was 0.29 Mb/d and during Q1 2015 the average US daily stock build was 1.10 Mb/d.
Demand for US stock build was up 0.8 Mb/d year over year. This stronger stock build temporarily adds to (global) demand and supports the oil price.
What drives this strong stock build is the price spread between contracts for prompt/front month deliveries versus contracts for later deliveries when the futures curve is in what is referred to as contango, refer also figure 3.
The recent strong builds in US crude oil storage may give away some clues about underlying developments in consumption.
Demand = Consumption + Stock changes = Supplies
The saying is that hindsight (always) provides 20/20 vision.
In this post I present a retrospective look at my prediction from 2012 published on The Oil Drum (The “Red Queen” series) where I predicted that Light Tight Oil (LTO) extraction from Bakken in North Dakota would not move much above 0.7 Mb/d.
- Profitable drilling in Bakken for LTO extraction has been, is and will continue to be dependent on an oil price above a certain threshold, now about $68/Bbl at the wellhead (or around $80/Bbl [WTI]) on a point forward basis.
(The profitability threshold depends on the individual well’s productivity and companies’ return requirements.)
- Complete analysis of developments to LTO extraction should encompass the resilience of the oil companies’ balance sheets and their return requirements.
LTO extraction in Bakken (and in other plays like Eagle Ford) happened due to a higher oil price as it involves the deployment of expensive technologies which again is at the mercy of:
- Consumers affordability, that is their ability to continue to pay for more expensive oil
- Changes in global total debt levels (credit expansion), like the recent years rapid credit expansion in emerging economies, primarily China.
- Central banks’ policies, like the recent years’ expansions of their balance sheets and low interest rate policies
- Credit/debt is a vehicle for consumers to pay (create demand) for a product/service
- Credit/debt is also used by companies to generate supplies to meet changes to demand
- What companies in reality do is to use expectations of future cash flows (from consumers’ abilities to take on more debt) as collateral to themselves go deeper into debt.
- Credit/debt, thus works both sides of the supply/demand equation
- How OPEC shapes their policies as responses to declines in the oil price
Will OPEC establish and defend a price floor for the oil price?
I have recently and repeatedly pointed out;
- Any forecasts of oil (and gas) demand/supplies and oil price trajectories are NOT very helpful if they do not incorporate forecasts for changes to total global credit/debt, interest rates and developments to consumers’/societies’ affordability.
Oil is a global commodity which price is determined in the global marketplace.
Added liquidity and low interest rates provided by the world’s dominant central bank, the Fed, has also played some role in the developments in LTO extraction from the Bakken formation in North America.
As numerous people repeatedly have said; “Never bet against the Fed!” to which I will add “…and China’s determination to expand credit”.
Let me be clear, I do not believe that the Fed’s policies have been aimed at supporting developments in Bakken (or other petroleum developments) this is in my opinion unintended consequences.
In Bakken two factors helped grow and sustain a high number of well additions (well manufacturing);
- A high(er) oil price
- Growing use of cheap external funding (primarily debt)
In the summer of 2012 I found it hard to comprehend what would sustain the oil price above $80/Bbl (WTI).
The mechanisms that supported the high oil price was well understood, what lacked was documentation from authoritative sources about the scale of the continued accommodative policies from major central banks’ (balance sheet expansions [QE] and low interest rate policies) and as important; global total credit expansion, which in recent years was driven by China and other emerging economies.
I have described more about this in my post World Crude Oil Production and the Oil Price.
This is another installment of my work in progress about credit, interest rates and the oil price. Though many of the mechanisms for some time (as in several years and in some circles) have been well understood, nothing beats having the cover of data/reports from authoritative sources.
In this post I present the observations and results from the research of the developments in some selected OECD countries and emerging economies (non OECD) in their petroleum consumption together with the relative developments in their total non financial debt since 1999.
This may put into context how emerging economies were able to grow their petroleum consumption as the oil price grew and remained high. Likewise provide some insights into some of the mechanisms at work that caused a decline in petroleum consumption for the selected OECD countries.
The selected countries presented and the world had the following changes in their total petroleum consumption between 2005 and 2013 based upon data from BP Statistical Review 2014:
OECD countries: – 4.04 Mb/d (decline)
Emerging economies: 8.39 Mb/d (growth)
Growth in world petroleum consumption: 6.94 Mb/d
The numbers illustrate that the emerging economies’ total growth in petroleum consumption was greater than the world’s from 2005 to 2013. These emerging economies effectively bid out OECD for a portion of its consumption to meet its own growing demand.
· How was this accomplished?
· Were the emerging economies about to decouple from the advanced economies?
· What caused petroleum consumption for the OECD countries to decline?
I set out to explore what could be the likely causes by looking into the relative changes in total non financial debt of these countries armed with data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS, in Basel, Switzerland) placed together with the changes in their petroleum consumption as from the end of 1999 with data from BP Statistical Review 2014.
It turns out that changes in petroleum consumption for these countries closely follow relative changes to total private non financial debts. Then add changes in sovereign/public debt.
Demand is not what one wants, but what one can pay for.
And expectations for demand drives investments for supplies.
Credit is a vehicle which allows for demand to be pulled forward in time and to some extent negates any price growth and allows for investments to meet expected demand changes.
Credit works both sides of the demand and supply equation.
In this post I present a closer look into the developments in the Norwegian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the Marginal Productivity of Debt (MPD) from households, non-Financials and municipalities.
Further a brief update on developments in credit/debt growth (for households, non-Financials and municipalities) in Norway. Sovereign debt and debts in the financial sector are not included in this analysis and for a complete analysis ALL DEBTS have to be included. Norway is a small and open economy that is exposed to developments in the global economy (like the price of oil) and its trade relations.
This post is an expansion to my previous post A closer Look into the Drivers of the Norwegian Economy’s recent Growth Success with some updates.
The post also presents a brief look at how recent years developments in the oil price and total petroleum extraction and sales have affected Norwegian GDP, credit/debt growth, the MPD and petroleum related expenditures and what this may portend for the near future.
NOTE: All financial data in this post are in the Giga Norwegian krone (GNOK; Billion NOK) unless otherwise specified. 6 NOK approximates now around 1 US dollar.
The chart illustrates how the Norwegian GDP has been on a steady growth trajectory during the recent four decades and how petroleum activities, which started in the late 1960’s, gained in relative importance of GDP developments. The effects of growth in the petroleum activities are documented to spill over into the mainland GDP.
In 2013 around 23% of Norway’s GDP was from petroleum related activities.
The acceleration in the Norwegian GDP from around 2004 have been identified to come from two main sources;
- The growth in the oil price that really took off from around 2004 spilled over to the mainland economy.
- The credit/debt growth from households, non-Financials and municipalities.
This was likely triggered by the growth in the oil price as it revived consumers’ perception of improved outlooks to service more debt as disposable income grew and interest rates started to decline (cheap credit), which again was reinforced from the feedback from rising housing prices and growth in stock indices (equity growth).
As Norwegian petroleum extraction is in general decline and its gross revenues subject to oil price developments, the remaining force to sustain Norwegian GDP growth is to entice the households for continued growth in debt financed consumption.
Her følger noen utvalgte inntrykk fra BP Statistical Review 2013. BP sine årlige Statistical Review regnes som en av de mest autorative kildene for energidata og brukes mye som referanse.
Det globale energiforbruket viser fortsatt vekst også drevet av vekst i gjeld og nå primært fra fortsatt vekst i offentlig gjeld.
Energimarkedene er svært dynamiske der prisforskjeller mellom energikildene nå driver frem en raskere global vekst for kull blant de fossile energikildene.
I dette innlegget vil jeg dele noen av mine observasjoner av og refleksjoner for hva sannsynlig retning oljeprisen vil ta i nær fremtid.
Innenfor OECD blir nå et voksende antall forbrukere av økonomiske årsaker drevet til å redusere sitt forbruk av dyr olje. I noen tilfeller der substitusjon med andre og billigere energikilder er mulige, så skjer dette, ref også figur 10. Dette gir nå en svakere global etterspørselsvekst samtidig med at tilbudssiden bedres blant annet gjennom fortsatt vekst i utvinningen av skiferolje (tight oil) og oljesand og OPEC antas å ha noe reservekapasitet.
Figuren illustrerer også at den sterke gjeldsveksten (også) tillot vekst i oljeprisen og at gjeldsveksten nå er lavere. Samtidig har forbrukerne gradvis fått en svekket evne til å betale for dyr olje mens kostnadene for de marginale fatene er generelt voksende.
Bevegelsene i oljeprisen de siste årene kan også skape inntrykk av at oljeprisen har vært gjenstand for spekulativt press. De som tjener på en høyere oljepris er mange; oljeselskapene (både private og nasjonale) selvsagt, men også leverandører av varer og tjenester til oljeselskapene. Mindre fokus har det vært på at økte investeringer skapt av en høyere oljepris ofte resulterer i økt bruk av gjeld av oljeselskapene for å skape finansiell vekst. Leverandørene av gjeld/kreditt (banker/finansinstitusjoner) til oljeselskapene har dermed fått vekst i sitt inntektsgrunnlag til en svært lav risiko.
Selskapene bruker gjeldsvekst for å øke/holde oppe utvinningen av olje og gass og dermed det finansielle overskuddet. Veksten i de finansielle overskuddene for oljeselskapene som tillot vekst i investeringene for ny kapasitet var også drevet av privat og offentlig gjeldsvekst.
Gjeldsveksten har nå bremset og på et eller annet tidspunkt vil denne reverseres for å bringe gjeldsoverhenget ned, dette bør også ventes å få følger for oljeetterspørselen og dermed oljeprisen.
I dette innlegget vil jeg presentere historisk norsk oljeutvinning og utvikling i funn og reserver og hva dette nå gir av forventninger til fremtidig norsk oljeutvinning.
Innlegget er en oppdatering av; Norske råoljereserver og utvinning per 2011.
Figur 1 nedenfor illustrerer at fallet i den norske råoljeutvinningen fortsetter å trosse de siste årenes sterke prisoppgang på råolje. Den voksende råoljeprisen har bidratt til å dempe fallet i råoljeutvinningen og stimulert til økt utbyggings og letevirksomhet.
Siden råoljeutvinningen toppet i 2001 med 3,12 Mb/d (millioner fat for dagen) hadde den i 2012 falt til under 50 % (1,53 Mb/d) av toppnivået. Dette har blitt overskygget av at prisen har økt rundt 4 ganger nivået fra 2001 og dermed mer enn kompensert for fallet i fysisk utvinning.
Oljedirektoratet sin ferskeste prognose venter at råoljeutvinningen vil falle til 1,47 Mb/d (millioner fat for dagen) i 2013 fra 1,53 Mb/d i 2012.
Figur 1 illustrerer at de største funnene gjøres først, kommer raskt i utvinning og med tiden (og avhengig av oljeprisen) blir de mindre funnene utviklet.