Posts Tagged ‘bond hurdles’
In retrospect, it becomes easier to understand the amazing growth and resilience of Light Tight Oil (LTO) extraction from Bakken (and other US tight oil plays) if the effects from the use of huge amounts of debts (including assets and equities sales) is put into this context.
Debt leverage together with a high oil price are what stimulated the US LTO extraction for some time to appear as something like a license to print money.
Now, and as long present low oil prices persist, the LTO companies are in financial straitjackets.
- It was high CAPEX in 2015 from external funding, primarily debt and assets/equities sales, that created the impression of LTO’s resilience to lower oil prices (ref also figure 2).
Actual data show that so far there has been some improvements in well productivities [cumulative versus time]. However, these improvements by themselves do not fully explain the apparent resilience of LTO extraction to lower oil prices.
- NONE of the wells now added in the Bakken are on trajectories to become profitable at present prices (ref also figure 3).
The average well now needs about $80/bo at the wellhead to be on a profitable trajectory.
(The average spread between WTI and North Dakota Sweet has been and is above $10/bo.)
- As far as actual data from NDIC on well productivity (EUR trajectories) provide any guidance it is not expected that well manufacturing will pick up in a meaningful way before the oil price moves and remains above $60/bo @ WH.
Writing down the drilling cost and rebasing profitability from completion costs [for DUCs, Drilled UnCompleted wells] does not change this fact.
- The decline in the LTO extraction will (all things equal) relentlessly erode future funding capacities for drilling and completion [well manufacturing].
- It is now all about the net cash flow from operations, debt service and retirement of debts [clearing the bond hurdles]. Debt management and debt restructuring will remain on top of the agenda for management of LTO companies. It should be expected that the management of these companies will do everything in their powers to clear the bond hurdles and keep their companies out of bankruptcy.
- For 2016 well additions in the Bakken will fall below the threshold that allows to fully replace extracted reserves.
In the industry this is referred to as the Reserves Replacement Ratio (RRR).
For the Bakken the RRR for 2016 is now expected to be below 50%.
(This lowers the collateral of the LTO companies and their debt carrying capacities.)
At present prices several companies cannot both retire their debts according to present redemption profiles and manufacture a lot of wells. This is why it is suspected that halting all drilling (where feasible [i.e. Contracts without stiff penalties for cancellation]) and deferring completions have become a necessity born out of the requirements for debt management.
This analysis presents:
- A forecast on total LTO extraction for Bakken (ND, MB/TF) towards the end of 2017.
- A closer look at a generic LTO company in Bakken and its near future challenges with clearing the bond hurdles.
(The generic LTO company is based on [weighted] financial data from several, primarily Bakken invested companies’ Security and Exchange Commissions (SEC) 10-K/Q filings for 2015).
To keep the focus on the (debt) dynamics in play, The Financial Red Queen, I opted to use a generic company. This is also done to play down discussions about specific companies.
- The important message to drive home is how declining cash flow from operations, the big debt overhang and clearing the bond hurdles will constrain many LTO companies’ funding (CAPEX) for well manufacturing [drilling and/or completion] as long as oil prices remain below $60/bo @WH (or about $70/bo, WTI).
- With sustained low oil prices, the servicing of total debt has been and will be the power that forces companies deep in debt and heavily exposed to LTO into bankruptcies and causes losses on creditors and become the real driver behind the steep decline in LTO extraction.