FRACTIONAL FLOW

Fractional flow, the flow that shapes our future.

Norwegian Crude Oil Reserves And Extraction per 2015

In this post I present actual Norwegian crude oil extraction and status on the development in discoveries and reserves and what this has now resulted in for expectations for future Norwegian crude oil extraction.

This post is also an update of an earlier post about Norwegian crude oil reserves and production per 2014.

Norwegian crude oil extraction peaked in 2001 at 3.12 Million barrels per day (Mb/d) and in 2015 it was 1.57 Mb/d, growing from 1.51 Mb/d in 2014.

The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate’s (NPD) recent forecast expects crude oil extraction from the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) will decline to 1.53 Mb/d in 2016.

Figure 01: The chart shows the historical extraction (production) of crude oil (by discovery/field) for the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) with data from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) for the years 1970 - 2015. The chart also includes my forecast for crude oil extraction from discoveries/fields towards 2030 based on reviews on individual fields, NPD’s estimates of remaining recoverable reserves, the development/forecast for the R/P ratio as of end 2015. Further, the chart shows a forecast for total crude oil extraction from sanctioned discoveries/fields (green area, refer also figure 02) and expected contribution from Johan Sverdrup (blue area) [at end 2015 estimated at 1.76 Gb; [Gb, Giga (Billion) barrels, refer also figure 06] and this development phase is now scheduled to start flowing in late 2019.

Figure 01: The chart shows the historical extraction (production) of crude oil (by discovery/field) for the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) with data from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) for the years 1970 – 2015. The chart also includes my forecast for crude oil extraction from discoveries/fields towards 2030 based on reviews on individual fields, NPD’s estimates of remaining recoverable reserves, the development/forecast for the R/P ratio as of end 2015.
Further, the chart shows a forecast for total crude oil extraction from sanctioned discoveries/fields (green area, refer also figure 02) and expected contribution from Johan Sverdrup (blue area) [at end 2015 estimated at 1.76 Gb; [Gb, Giga (Billion) barrels, refer also figure 06] and this development phase is now scheduled to start flowing in late 2019.

Sanctioned Developments in Figure 01 represents the total contributions from 7 sanctioned developments of discoveries now scheduled to start to flow between 2016 and 2019.

My forecast for 2016 is 1.50 Mb/d with crude oil from the NCS.

My forecast shown in figure 01 includes all sanctioned developments and not discoveries (refer also figure 08) and contingent resources in the fields. The forecast is subject to revisions as the reserve base becomes revised (as discoveries pass the commercial hurdles) which likely will fatten the tail of the presented forecast post 2020.

My forecast assumes some reserve growth, but does not include the effects from fields/discoveries being plugged and abandoned as these reach the end of their economic life.

Discoveries sanctioned for development and Johan Sverdrup (with an expected start up late 2019) is expected to slow down the decline in Norwegian crude oil extraction.

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The Oil Price – Some (Mar-16) Observations and Thoughts

In this post I present some selected parameters I monitor which may help understand near term (2-3 years) oil price movements and levels.

It has been my understanding for some time that the formulations of fiscal and monetary policies also affects the commodities markets. Changes to total global debt has and will continue to affect consumers’/societies’ affordability and thus also the price formation of oil.

I have earlier asserted;

Any forecasts of oil (and gas) demand/supplies and oil price trajectories are NOT very helpful if they do not incorporate forecasts for changes to total global credit/debt, interest rates and developments to consumers’/societies’ affordability.

  • The permanence of the global supply overhang could be prolonged if consumption/demand developments soften/weakens and it is not possible to rule out a near term decline.
  • Recent demand/consumption data for total US petroleum products supplied show signs of saturation which provides headwinds for any upwards movements in the oil price.
  • While prices were high many oil companies went deeper into debt in a bid to increase production of costlier oil. Many responded to the price collapse with attempts to sustain/grow production in efforts to moderate cash flow declines and thus ease debt service.
  • If the forward [futures] curve moves from a present weak contango (ref also figure 02) to backwardation, this would erode support for the oil price.
  • Some suggest that growth from India will take over as China’s growth slows.
    Looking at the data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) there is nothing there that now suggests India (refer also figure 05) has started to accelerate its debt expansion. The Indian Rupee has depreciated versus the US dollar, thus offsetting some of the stimulative consumption effects from a lower oil price.

The recent weeks oil price volatility has likely been influenced by several factors like short squeezes, rumors and fluid sentiments.

Near term factors that likely will move the oil price higher.

  • Continued growth in debt primarily in China and the US. {This will go on until it cannot!}
  • Another round with concerted efforts of the major central banks with lower interest rates and quantitative easing.

And/or

  • A tightening in the global oil demand/supply balance from whatever reasons.

I also believe that D E M A N D (consumption) developments now are more important than widely recognized and that demand/consumption developments will play a major factor in as from when oil prices will regain support to move to a sustainable higher level.

I now hold it 90% probable that the oil price will enter a new leg down, and that the low in January 2016 could be taken out.

Recently the total US petroleum demand growth had two components

  1. Growth in consumption, mainly driven by the collapse of the oil price
  2. Noticeable growth in petroleum stocks (primarily crude oil) since late 2014 driven by a favorable contango.

The combined effects from these grew annualized US petroleum demand by 1.3 Mb/d relative to January 2014 (ref also figure 01). US consumption growth has now stalled, which may suggest saturation from the lower oil price is about to be reached.

Figure 01: The chart above shows development in annualized [52 weeks moving averages] US total petroleum consumption [blue line] and storage build [red line] both rh scale. The black line, lh scale, shows development in the oil price (WTI). Consumption and storage developments are relative to Janaury 2014 (baseline). NOTE, changes in consumption and stocks are stacked, thus the red line also shows total annualized changes in demand.

Figure 01: The chart above shows development in annualized [52 weeks moving averages] US total petroleum consumption [blue line] and storage build [red line] both rh scale. The black line, lh scale, shows development in the oil price (WTI). Consumption and storage developments are relative to Janaury 2014 (baseline).
NOTE, changes in consumption and stocks are stacked, thus the red line also shows total annualized changes in demand.

In the last 6 months total US petroleum consumption developments have stalled and there are some relative changes amongst the products (ref below).

A weakened contango (ref also figure 02) will likely reduce demand for storage.

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Bakken(ND) Light Tight Oil – Update with Sep – 15 NDIC Data

After years of following developments in extraction of light tight oil (LTO) in the Bakken, the oil price, studying actual well production data from the North Dakota Industrial Commission (NDIC) and the SEC 10-Q/Ks filings for several companies heavily exposed to the Bakken, a quote from Shakespeare’s Macbeth comes to the fore of my mind:

All causes shall give way: I am in blood

Stepp’d in so far that, should I wade no more,

Returning were as tedious as go o’er:

                                              (Macbeth: Act III, Scene IV)

For me the Macbeth quote very much sums up the predicament many Bakken LTO operators now find themselves in.

Figure 01: The above chart shows developments by vintage in LTO extraction from the Middle Bakken/ Three Forks/Sanish formations in Bakken (ND) as of January 2008 and of September 2015 [right hand scale]. The color grading shows extraction by month. Development in the oil price (WTI) black line is shown versus the left hand scale.

Figure 01: The above chart shows developments by vintage in LTO extraction from the Middle Bakken/ Three Forks/Sanish formations in Bakken (ND) as of January 2008 and of September 2015 [right hand scale].
The color grading shows extraction by month.
Development in the oil price (WTI) black line is shown versus the left hand scale.

What this study/update present:

  • With the decline in the oil price the average well as from the 2012 vintage will struggle to reach payout and become profitable.
    (The oil price decline reduces the portion of the more recent wells that are on trajectories to reach payout and become profitable.)
  • The 2015 vintage follows the 2014 vintage closely, suggesting that around 20% of the wells of 2015 vintage are on a trajectory to reach payout and become profitable.
  • The underlying decline from the legacy wells is strong. The extraction from all the wells started between Jan 2008 and Dec 2014 declined by close to 440 kb (or about 41%) from Dec 2014 to Sep 2015.
  • Some of the early wells (2008 vintage) have been restimulated (refracked) and the effects are short lived and the economics of this looks questionable, at best.
  • A near steep decline in LTO extraction from the Bakken is baked into the cake due to the financial dynamics created by a lasting low oil price.
  • An average of around 136 wells/month were added so far in 2015 while extraction declined close to 60 kb/d, suggesting 140 – 150 wells needs to be added each month to sustain present extraction levels.

Studying the SEC 10-K/Qs for several of the companies that are heavily weighted in the Bakken shows that natural gas and NGLs (Natural Gas Liquids) are weighing down the financial results for many companies.

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Written by Rune Likvern

Monday, 30 November, 2015 at 21:49

Status of Norwegian Natural Gas at end of 2014 and Forecasts towards 2025

In this post I present actual Norwegian natural gas production, status on reserves, the development in discoveries and what this results for Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and my expectations for the future delivery potential for Norwegian natural gas.

Norway, after Russia, has been and is the EU’s second biggest supplier of natural gas.

Included is also a brief look at developments in actual consumption and production of natural gas in the EU 28 (the 28 members of the European Union).

  • NPD revised down their band for future delivery potential by about 10 Gcm/a (Bcm/a) and moved the start of decline one year forward relative to their forecast last year.
  • I now expect the Norwegian delivery potential for natural gas relative to 2014/2015 to decline by more than 40% by 2025.
  • Europe will increasingly have to rely on natural gas imports from more distant sources and should by now have implemented policies for the role natural gas will have in its future energy mix.

This post is an update to my post in 2014 looking at the status as of end 2013.

Figure 1: The chart above shows development in natural gas exports from production installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) as reported by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) from 1996 to 2014 and with my forecast for delivery potential towards 2025. The chart also shows the NPD forecasts; green line upper projection, orange line lower projection. NPD’s central projection is in about the middle of the green and orange lines. The black dotted line is the forecast from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA WEO 2012). Numbers are believed to be gross exports from the production installations and thus not adjusted for “shrinkage” from Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) extraction, primarily at Kollsnes and Kårstø. The NGL extraction reduces total sales gas volumes with around 4% relative to what is exported from the producing installations. Numbers in Gcm, Giga cubic meters (Gcm = Bcm; Billion cubic meters)

Figure 1: The chart above shows development in natural gas exports from production installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) as reported by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) from 1996 to 2014 and with my forecast for delivery potential towards 2025.
The chart also shows the NPD forecasts; green line upper projection, orange line lower projection. NPD’s central projection is in about the middle of the green and orange lines.
The black dotted line is the forecast from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA WEO 2012).
Numbers are believed to be gross exports from the production installations and thus not adjusted for “shrinkage” from Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) extraction, primarily at Kollsnes and Kårstø. The NGL extraction reduces total sales gas volumes with around 4% relative to what is exported from the producing installations.
Numbers in Gcm, Giga cubic meters (Gcm = Bcm; Billion cubic meters)

My forecast  and NPD’s forecast at end 2014 are basically identical towards the end of this decade, but differs about the timing for the start of the decline and how steep this will become as from early next decade. My forecast is also tested versus the Reserves over Production (R/P) ratio as of end 2014, refer also figure 2.

At end 2014 the NPD projection of Norwegian natural gas supply potential towards 2025 was revised down.

NPD’s central projection is in about the middle of the green and orange lines. Note the span of uncertainties in the NPD’s forecast.

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The Oil Price and EMEs growth in Credit and Petroleum Consumption since 2000

In this post I present a closer look at the credit growth for 6 Emerging Market Economies (EME) together with the developments in their and the net oil exporters petroleum consumption for the period 2000 to 2014.

The 6 EMEs are; Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.

  • Where did the lion’s share of growth in global petroleum consumption end up since 2000?
  • What was the likely mechanism/vehicle that allowed for this?

This post is an update and expansion to my post “Changes in Total Global Credit Affect The Oil Price”

  • The credit growth for the EMEs was strong in absolute and relative terms (also as a percentage of GDP) since 2009. As from 2013 the EMEs credit growth slowed (decelerated).
  • The EMEs credit growth gained momentum as the big central banks lowered interest rates and started Quantitative Easings (QE), refer also figures 02 and 04.
  • As the EMEs enter debt saturation (little room left on their balance sheets {little remaining quality collateral} to take on more credit/debt) expect this to affect their consumption and their potential to pay for higher priced oil.
  • Potential for continued [global] credit growth will for some time become one of the vital factors that define the sustainable ceiling for the oil price.
  • Demand is what one can pay for. In other words, demand is monetary in nature. Credit acts as money and adds to aggregate demand.
    Credit growth also made it possible to bid up and pay for higher priced oil during the recent years.
  • If the oil price, for whatever combination of reasons, moves to a sustainable higher level, it should be expected that those who are left with limited/no access to more credit will reduce their consumption/demand for oil.

Figure 01: The stacked areas in the chart show the growth in petroleum consumption for the 6 EMEs and the net oil exporters from 2000 to 2014 [2000 has been used as a baseline]. Total growth for the 6 EMEs are shown by the black dotted line. The red dashed line shows the change in total global petroleum consumption since 2000. [These are shown versus the right axis]. The development in the oil price is shown by yellow circles connected by a grey line versus the left axis.

Figure 01: The stacked areas in the chart show the growth in petroleum consumption for the 6 EMEs and the net oil exporters from 2000 to 2014 [2000 has been used as a baseline]. Total growth for the 6 EMEs are shown by the black dotted line.
The red dashed line shows the change in total global petroleum consumption since 2000. [These are shown versus the right axis].
The development in the oil price is shown by yellow circles connected by a grey line versus the left axis.

The chart above shows several interesting developments.

  • The strong growth in petroleum consumption from the 6 EMEs and net oil exporters since 2000.
  • Early in the previous decade the OECD countries also grew their petroleum consumption as a response to central banks’ lowered interest rates that allowed for further credit expansion [kicking the can until there is no more road left].
  • A shift occurred post the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2008.
    The 6 EMEs and net exporters outbid OECD (and others) for a portion of their petroleum consumption.
    (This is shown by the growth in global petroleum consumption [the red dotted line] which since 2008 did not fully meet growth in consumption from the 6 EMEs and net oil exporters.
    The 6 EMEs and the net oil exporters increased their total petroleum consumption with 17.1 Mb/d (from 26.7 Mb/d in 2000 to 43.7 Mb/d in 2014), while global consumption grew by 15.2 Mb/d to 92.1 Mb/d.
  • OECD reduced its petroleum consumption from 48.0 Mb/d (2008) to 45.1 Mb/d (2014).
    OECD countries slowed and/or reversed credit expansion (deleveraged [default is one way to deleverage]) and introduced austerity measures in a bid to manage their credit overhang.
  • The net oil exporters (countries/regions) that saw noticeable growth in their petroleum consumption in the period are; Canada, Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Norway, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan and the regions Middle East and Africa. There are other small net oil exporters like Denmark, Trinidad&Tobago which had small changes to their petroleum consumption.
  • Indonesia became a net petroleum importer as of 2003 and Malaysia as of 2011.

The net oil exporters spent some of the increased revenues from higher priced oil for social programs to improve living standards and as leverage for increased investments to sustain and/or grow oil supplies (which require energy!) for what looked like a sustained growth in demand/consumption that would support a lasting high oil price.

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Written by Rune Likvern

Saturday, 5 September, 2015 at 19:01

World Crude Oil Production and the Oil Price, August 2015

In this post I present some of my observations and thoughts about the developments in the oil price, supply and demand, exchange rates (relative to the US dollar), petroleum stocks and what near term factors are likely to influence the oil price.

  • The price of oil (and other commodities) appears to have been influenced by the central banks’ policies post the GFC of 2008 (Global Financial Crisis, primarily the Fed as the US dollar is the world’s major reserve currency) with low interest rates which allowed for growth in total global credit/debt.
  • As the Fed confirmed its end of QE3 (QE; Quantitative Easing) program by the fall of 2014, the oil price started to decline. This decline became amplified by an oversupply resulting from years of debt fueled high capital expenditures by the oil companies to develop supplies of costlier oil for the market to meet expectations of growth in consumption.
  • With the end of QE3 the US dollar rapidly appreciated versus most other major currencies, which offset some of the decline in the oil price in most economies (oil is priced in US dollar), the exceptions being the US and China (which has its currency pegged to the US dollar).
  • Demand and consumption of oil (actual data so far only for the US) responded to the price collapse by some growth. However the world’s growth has not been sufficient to close the gap between supplies and consumption, thus sustaining a downward pressure on the oil price.
  • The oil price collapse motivated oil companies with low variable costs (OPEX) to compensate some of the loss of cash flow by increasing their production (volumes), thus creating a dynamic where growing supplies went looking for demand.
  • The oil price collapse and a period with a favorable contango spread incentivized a strong build in stocks and as stocks remain at elevated levels, it may take some time before stocks return to “normal” levels.

Figure 1: The chart above shows the developments in the oil price [Brent spot, black line. The red line is the smoothed one year moving average] and the time of central banks’ announcements/deployments of available monetary tools to support the global financial markets which the economy relies heavily upon. The financial system is virtual and thus highly responsive. NOTE: The chart suggests some causation between FED policies and movements to the oil price. The US dollar is the world’s major reserve currency and most currencies are joined to it at the hip.

Figure 1: The chart above shows the developments in the oil price [Brent spot, black line. The red line is the smoothed one year moving average] and the time of central banks’ announcements/deployments of available monetary tools to support the global financial markets which the economy relies heavily upon. The financial system is virtual and thus highly responsive.
NOTE: The chart suggests some causation between FED policies and movements to the oil price. The US dollar is the world’s major reserve currency and most currencies are joined to it at the hip.

The big unknown is how demand will develop. A global economy struggling with too much debt while running out of quality collateral will at some point experience the drags from growth in the services of the growing total debt. Continued growth in global credit/debt will increasingly be directed towards the services of the growing total amount of debt (kicking the can down the road as the economic productivity from additional credit/debt diminishes).

  • As growth in global credit/debt slows, comes to halt or deleveraging sets in, this will affect demand and prices, also for oil.

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Are the Light Tight Oil (LTO) Companies trying to outsmart Mother Nature with their Financial Balance Sheets?

In this post I present what I found from applying R/P (Reserves divided by [annual] Production) ratios for Light Tight Oil (LTO) for 3 big companies in Bakken/Three Forks/Sanish.

The companies are; Continental Resources, Oasis Petroleum and Whiting Petroleum, which operated 28% of total LTO extraction in the Bakken(ND) in December 2014.

  • Undertaking oil and gas reserves assessments are just as much an art as a science.

From previous work with LTO from Bakken I kept track of the R/P ratio for wells/portfolios and generally found it was in the range of 3 – 4 after their first year of flow. This suggested that 25 – 35% of the wells’ Estimated Ultimate Recovery (EUR) was extracted in their first year of flow.

This made sense as extraction (production) from LTO wells are heavily front end loaded and have steep initial declines.

Examining some big Bakken companies SEC 10-K (SEC; Securities and Exchange Commission) filings for 2014 I noticed that these had R/P ratios for Proven Developed Reserves (PDP) that ranged from 7 – 9.

(Refer to the end of this post for more detailed explanations/definitions of PDP and PUD)

That did not make sense and R/P ratios give away powerful and very valuable information about likely future extraction trajectories.

About 50% of the companies’ total LTO extraction (flow) in Dec 2014 in Bakken (ND) were from wells started in 2014. In other words, the flow was dominated by “young” wells which decline rapidly. Therefore, whatever flow data (monthly, quarterly) that was annualized it should be expected a R/P ratio for total extraction around 4 for 2014.

What I present is how PDP, extraction data and R/P data derived from the 3 companies SEC 10-K statements compares to what was derived from actual data. Further, what actual data now is projecting for EUR for the average well for these companies.

Figure 1: The chart above shows developments in average well first year LTO totals (productivity) for some companies and by vintage. The colored columns for 2013 and 2015 show projected financial performance based on average well first year LTO totals. For 2013 the chart is based on: WTI at $98/b and a type well at $10M was found to have a 0% return with a total first year LTO flow at about  50 kb.  For 2015 the chart is based on: WTI at $60/b and a type well at $8M was found to have a 0% return with a total first year LTO flow at about 90 kb.  The chart illustrates that the well productivity has been on an upward trend. So far the productivity improvements and cost reductions have not fully compensated for the effects from a much lower oil price.  The profitability equation of the type well was solved for the equivalent total first year flow for various oil prices and costs on a point forward basis. A lower oil price makes the red columns “push” the other ones upwards (moves the profitability bands upwards). Wells of 2015 vintage (pre May) are on a trajectory close to those of the 2014 vintage. kb,  kilo barrels = 1,000 barrels

Figure 1: The chart above shows developments in average well first year LTO totals (productivity) for some companies and by vintage. The colored columns for 2013 and 2015 show projected financial performance based on average well first year LTO totals.
For 2013 the chart is based on: WTI at $98/b and a type well at $10M was found to have a 0% return with a total first year LTO flow at about 50 kb.
For 2015 the chart is based on: WTI at $60/b and a type well at $8M was found to have a 0% return with a total first year LTO flow at about 90 kb.
The chart illustrates that the well productivity has been on an upward trend. So far the productivity improvements and cost reductions have not fully compensated for the effects from a much lower oil price.
The profitability equation of the type well was solved for the equivalent total first year flow for various oil prices and costs on a point forward basis.
A lower oil price makes the red columns “push” the other ones upwards (moves the profitability bands upwards).
Wells of 2015 vintage (per May) are on a trajectory close to those of the 2014 vintage.
kb, kilo barrels = 1,000 barrels

LTO in Bakken will now generally work profitably with an oil price (WTI) above $80/b.

The willingness of several companies to sell more debt (obtain more credit), assets and equity to continue to manufacture LTO wells which estimates showed were not commercially viable have had many analysts puzzled.

Something was likely overlooked, and chances are that this is related to EUR driven incentives to expand assets/equity on the companies’ balance sheets (or “book to model”).

As companies drill wells and puts these in operation (production), it allows them to book reserves on the balance sheets. And reserves are the biggest portion of the LTO companies’ balance sheets.

The rush to use credit/debt to drill what likely would become unprofitable wells (applying project economics) with a lasting, low oil price appears driven by some perverse incentive to grow booked reserves to grow assets and thus equity on the companies’ balance sheets, overriding outlooks for poor profitability. High equity on the balance sheets allows for more debt.

Looking at actual, hard well data (from NDIC; North Dakota Industrial Commission) this strategy will at some point have to face up to the realities of physics and Nature. And physics and Nature do NOT negotiate.

  • Using actual data for LTO wells strongly suggests that the PDP (and thus PUD) estimates in companies’ SEC 10-K filings for 2014 are grossly inflated. If so, this has inflated the assets/equity numbers on the companies’ balance sheets.
  • The findings from this study suggest that the massive drilling activity funded by growing debt, was likely motivated by balance sheets expansions of assets, and thus the equity from inflated EUR numbers (“book to model”) which made room to take on more debt.
  • An inflated balance sheet that allows for a debt load above the carrying capacities of the real underlying collateral, will at some point in time turn against their creators and call for revisions of future plans and expectations.
  • It will be interesting to see how the LTO companies’ balance sheets and their profitability respond as it become Mother Nature’s turn with the bat.

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Written by Rune Likvern

Monday, 3 August, 2015 at 10:33

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