FRACTIONAL FLOW

Fractional flow, the flow that shapes our future.

World Crude Oil Supplies per July 2017

In this post I present developments in world crude oil (including condensates) supplies since January 2007 and per July 2017.

  • In this post the world crude oil (inclusive condensates) supplies is split into three entities, North America [Canada, Mexico and the US], OPEC(13) and other Non OPEC [World – {North America + OPEC(13)}] with a closer look at Brazil.
  • For OPEC(13) a closer look at developments of number of active oil rigs versus developments in the oil supplies. This is supplemented with developments in the oil supplies versus the number of active oil rigs for some selected OPEC countries.
  • Looking at figure 07 for OPEC(13) the increase in its supplies as of late 2014/early 2015 followed a period with noticeable growth in oil rigs and likely capacity expansions/modifications of oil process/treatment facilities.
    The accompanying increase in OPEC(13) supplies may simply have been rationalized from a pure business desire to recover the investments (CAPEX) from these capacity expansions.
  • Finally a closer look at developments in petroleum consumption/demand and stock changes for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
    The OECD has about half of total global petroleum consumption and a major portion of the global petroleum stocks.
  • “It took a lot of costly oil to bring down the oil price. This is the magic from lots of cheap credit.”

Data from this post is primarily from EIA Monthly Energy Review October 2017.

Figure 01: Figure 1: The stacked areas in the chart above shows changes to crude oil supplies split with North America [North America = Canada + Mexico + US], OPEC and other non OPEC [Other non OPEC = World – (OPEC + North America)] with January 2007 as a baseline and per July 2017. Developments in the oil price (Brent spot, black line) are shown against the left axis.

It was the oil companies’ rapid growth in CAPEX leveraged by cheap debt [ref US Light Tight Oil (LTO)] and expectations of a sustained higher oil price that brought about a situation where supplies started to run ahead of consumption/demand that brought the oil price down. During the run up to the oil price collapse, supplies also grew from other non OPEC (ex North America) from developments sanctioned while the oil price was high and expected to remain so.

Following the oil price collapse several of these developments had to take considerable write downs.

This coincided with increased OPEC supplies in what became widely explained as a bid from OPEC for market share.

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A little on the Profitability of the Bakken(ND)

In the first part of this post I present an update on the profitability for Light Tight Oil (LTO) extraction in the Bakken (ND) as one big project.

This is followed with economic life cycle analysis for the average LTO well of the 2014, 2015 and 2016 vintages in the Bakken.

This analysis found that companies in aggregate continue to outspend net cash flows from operations and for 2017 this is now expected to total $2 – $3 Billion.

  • The strong growth and sustained high LTO extraction from the Bakken were facilitated by considerable amounts of debts. The growth in total debts outstanding (employed capital) continues to grow, albeit at a slower pace.
  • With oil prices sustained at present levels the total employed capital (primarily debt) constitutes severe obstacles for the profitability for the Bakken.
  • In a scenario where no wells were added post 2017 and the wellhead (at WH) price remained at $40/bo [~ $50/bo WTI] estimated losses for the project would be $20 – $22 Billion.
  • In a scenario where no wells were added post 2017 and the wellhead price remained at $60/bo [~ $70/bo WTI], the payout was reached after 7,5 years (in 2025) and the estimated return for the project becomes 3,5%.
  • With a sustained wellhead price at $74/bo [~ $84/bo WTI] post 2017, the payout was reached after 4,3 years (in 2022) and the estimated return becomes 7%.
    What makes the profitability for the Bakken challenging are the number of years front loaded with negative cash flows.
  • So far the recent years improvements in flow and Estimated Ultimate Recovery (EUR) have not entirely caught up with the decline in and the sustained lower oil price.
  • For the average 2016 vintage well it was estimated that a sustained oil price of $53/bo at WH [~ $63/bo WTI] would return 7%.

    Figure 01: The chart above shows the estimated rolling 12 months totals [black columns] net cash flows. The red area shows the estimated cumulative net cash flow since Jan-09 and per Jul-17. LOE, G&A and interest rates (effective, i.e. adjusted for tax effects) based on a weighted average from several companies’ SEC 10-K/Q filings. Taxes according to what has been in force. Price of oil, North Dakota Sweet (NDS) and realized gas price as reported by several companies.

In the Bakken(ND) and since January 2009 and per July 2017 an estimated $100 Billion has been used for manufacturing operational LTO wells and at end July 2017 an estimated $35 Billion were outstanding to be recovered from the estimated remaining proven developed producing (PDP) reserves.

At the most CAPEX for well manufacturing in the Bakken out spent cash flow from operations at an annual rate of $9 Billion. For the Bakken there has been two distinct CAPEX cycles, the first in 2011/2012 while the oil price remained high, followed by another in 2015 after the collapse in the oil price.

The second cycle may have been rationalized by several factors like an expected rebound in the oil price, which OPEC (primarily its Middle East members) helped derail through their rapid increase in oil supplies starting in early 2015 in an (believed) effort to fight for market share. The second cycle may also have been rationalized by the incentive structure for management of LTO companies in which these were rewarded by volume growth over profitability.

Incurred costs for drilled, uncompleted wells (DUCs) and salt water disposal wells (SWDs) are not included. Directors cut for September 2017 listed 889 wells waiting for completion. Costs from any heavy and costly well maintenance/interventions are not included.

The DUCs represents $2,2 – $2,7 Billion in capital employed.

For the Bakken as one big project and the life cycle analysis the gross interest costs of 6% were reduced by 35% to reflect corporate tax effects.

Effects from hedges and from bankruptcy proceedings (debt restructuring) are not included.

Any arbitrage from the realized oil price adjusted for wellhead price, transport costs and any tax effects from this arbitrage are not included.

Some companies are now recirculating primarily borrowed money (at some interest) from the net operating cash flow and injecting additional capital  to continue the manufacturing of new wells.

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Written by Rune Likvern

Sunday, 8 October, 2017 at 19:26

Developments in Energy Consumption and Private and Public Debt per 2016

For some time I have explored the relations in developments for total debt [private and public], interest rates, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) energy consumption and thus also the oil price.

My theory has been that there are relations between changes to total debt and energy consumption and thus energy prices. Changes to total credit/debt should thus be reflected in energy consumption. Price formation is also influenced by several other factors and most prominently supply and demand balances.

To me, demand appears to be the one that is poorly understood and demand has been, is and will continue to be what one can pay for.

All transactions involving products and services require some amount of energy thus currency/money becomes a claim on energy.

During the last decades the world was in a gigantic experiment with debt expansion, most recently fueled by low interest policies which allowed to pull demand forward and for some time negate higher prices when demand ran ahead of supplies.

Debt expansions can go on until they cannot, as some economies already have experienced. In the recent decades, growth in total debt was higher than the growth in GDP (ref figure 1) and there is a strong relation between changes to total debt and GDP.

Figure 1: The chart above shows [stacked areas] developments in total private and public debt in Japan (black/grey), Euro area (yellow), US (blue) and China (red).
In the chart is also shown [stacked lines] developments on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the same 4 economies.
NOTE: All data are market value, US$.
The GDP (lines) have been stacked. The bottom line shows Japan, next is (Euro area + Japan) and the top line [China] also shows the total for the 4 presented economies.
Data on private and public debt from Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
Data on GDP from the World Bank [WB]. WB GDP data for 2016 were not publicly available as this was posted.
Note that total GDP for these 4 economies declined from 2014 to 2015.

In this post I also present a closer look at developments in energy consumption and total debts [private and public] for China, Italy, Japan, Spain, United Kingdom and USA.

As of 2016 these 6 countries had about 47% of the total global energy consumption and 42% of the total global petroleum consumption.

As the private sector debt growth slowed/reversed the public sector took over and it appears that public debt growth is not as potent to stimulate growth in energy consumption [and possibly GDP], but sustains or slows the decline in total energy consumption.

Part of the explanation for this may be that much  of the increased public deficit spending is directed towards social programs (more unemployment benefits etc.) which at best may sustain demand.

The 6 countries are presented in the sequence of how I perceive how far they are into the debt deleveraging cycle.

There are other forces at play here as well, as oil companies entered into a bet that high oil prices would be sustained by consumers continuing to have access to credit/debt, which would allow the oil companies in an orderly manner to retire their steep growth in debts required to develop the costlier oil. The debt fuelled growth in investments gradually created a situation where supplies ran ahead of demand, thus collapsing the oil price in 2014.

To me the sequence of events is:

Changes in credit/debt => Changes in energy consumption => Changes in GDP

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Norwegian Crude Oil Reserves And Extraction per 2016

In this post I present actual Norwegian crude oil extraction and status on the development in discoveries and reserves and what this has now resulted in for expectations for future Norwegian crude oil extraction.

This post is also an update of an earlier post about Norwegian crude oil reserves and production per 2015.

Norwegian crude oil extraction peaked in 2001 at 3.12 Million barrels per day (Mb/d) and in 2016 it was 1.62 Mb/d, growing from 1.57 Mb/d in 2015 and 1,46 Mb/d in 2013 (a growth of 10% since 2013).

The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate’s (NPD) recent forecast expects crude oil extracted from the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) to become 1.60 Mb/d in 2017.

Figure 01: The chart shows the historical extraction (production) of crude oil (by discovery/field) for the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) with data from the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) for the years 1970 – 2016. The chart also includes my forecast for crude oil extraction from discoveries/fields towards 2030 based on reviews on individual fields, NPD’s estimates of remaining recoverable reserves, the development/forecast for the R/P ratio as of end 2016.
Further, the chart shows a forecast for total crude oil extraction from sanctioned discoveries/fields (green area, refer also figure 02) and expected contribution from Johan Sverdrup phase I (blue area) [at end 2016 estimated at 1.78 Gb; [Gb, Giga (Billion) barrels, refer also figure 07] and this development phase is now scheduled to start flowing in late 2019.

Sanctioned Developments in Figure 01 represents the total contributions from 7 sanctioned developments of discoveries now scheduled to start to flow between 2017 and 2019.

My forecast for 2017 is 1.51 Mb/d with crude oil from the NCS.

My forecast shown in figure 01 includes all producing and sanctioned developments, but not contingent resources in the fields (business areas). The forecast is subject to revisions as the reserve base becomes revised (as discoveries pass the commercial hurdles) the tail is likely to fatten as from 2022/2023 mainly due to Johan Sverdrup phase II and Johan Castberg (Barents Sea).

My forecast includes about 7% reserve growth (300 Mb) for discoveries in the extraction phase, but does not include the effects from fields/discoveries being plugged and abandoned as these reach the end of their economic life.

Discoveries sanctioned for development and Johan Sverdrup (with an expected start up late 2019) is expected to generally slow down the decline in Norwegian crude oil extraction.

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Will growing Costs of new Oil Supplies knock against declining Consumers’ Affordability?

In this post I present developments in world crude oil (including condensates) supplies since January 2007 and per June 2016. Further a closer look at petroleum demand (consumption and stock changes) developments in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for the same period and what this implies about demand developments in non OECD.

The data used for this analysis comes from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) Monthly Energy Review.

  • The OECD has about half of total global petroleum consumption.
  • Since December 2015 OECD total annualized petroleum consumption has grown about 0.2 Mb/d [0.5%].
    [Primarily led by growth in US gasoline and kerosene consumption, ref also figure 6.]
  • The OECD petroleum stock building was about 0.4 Mb/d during Jan-16 – Jun-16, which is a decline of about 0.6 Mb/d from the same period in 2015. This implies a 2016YTD net decline in total OECD demand of 0.4 Mb/d.
  • World crude oil supplies, according to EIA data, have declined 1.3 Mb/d from December-15 to June-16, ref figures 1 and 2.
  • The above implies that non OECD crude oil consumption/demand has declined about 1 Mb/d since December 2015.
    This while the oil price [Brent Spot] averaged about $40/b.

This may now have (mainly) 2 explanations;

  1. The present EIA data for crude oil for the recent months under reports actual world crude oil supply, thus the supply data for 2016 should be expected to be subject to upward revisions in the future.
  2. Consumption/demand in some non OECD regions/countries are in decline and this with an oil price below $50/b.
    If this should be the case, then it needs a lot of attention as it may be a vital sign of undertows driving world oil demand.
    Oil is priced in US$ and US monetary policies (the FED) affect the exchange rate for other countries that in addition have a portion of their debts denominated in US$ thus their oil consumption is also subject to the ebb and flows from exchange rate changes.

Figure 1: The stacked areas in the chart above shows changes to crude oil supplies split with North America [North America = Canada + Mexico + US], OPEC and other non OPEC [Other non OPEC = World - (OPEC + North America)] with January 2007 as a baseline and per June 2016. Developments in the oil price (Brent spot, black line) are shown against the left axis.

Figure 1: The stacked areas in the chart above shows changes to crude oil supplies split with North America [North America = Canada + Mexico + US], OPEC and other non OPEC [Other non OPEC = World – (OPEC + North America)] with January 2007 as a baseline and per June 2016. Developments in the oil price (Brent spot, black line) are shown against the left axis.

It was the oil companies’ rapid growth in debt [ref US Light Tight Oil (LTO)] that brought about a situation where supplies ran ahead of consumption and brought the oil price down.

YTD 2016, only OPEC has shown growth in crude oil supplies relative to 2015.

Unit costs ($/b) to bring new oil supplies to the market is on a general upward trajectory while the consumers’ affordability threshold may be in general decline.

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Status of Norwegian Natural Gas at end of 2015 and Forecasts towards 2025

In this post I present actual Norwegian natural gas production, status on reserves, the development in discoveries and what this results for Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and my expectations for the future delivery potential for Norwegian natural gas.

Norway, after Russia, has been and is the EU’s second biggest supplier of natural gas.

Norway is the third largest gas exporter in the world. In 2015, Norway exported about 114 Gcm (Bcm) gas, mainly to other countries in Europe.

Included is also a brief look at developments in actual consumption and production of natural gas in the 28 members of the European Union (the EU 28).

  • NPD in their most recent forecast further revised down and narrowed their band for future delivery potential with about 10 Gcm/a (Bcm/a) by 2025 and pushed forward the start of decline one year relative to their previous forecast.
  • I now expect the Norwegian delivery potential for natural gas relative to 2015 to decline by more than 40% by 2025.
  • Europe will increasingly have to rely on natural gas imports from more distant sources and should by now have defined policies for the role natural gas will have in its future energy mix.

This post is an update to my post in 2015 looking at the status as of end 2014.

Figure 1: The chart above shows development in natural gas exports from production installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) as reported by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) from 1996 to 2015 and with my forecast for delivery potential towards 2025. The chart also shows the band of NPD forecasts; green line upper projection, orange line lower projection. NPD’s central projection is in about the middle of the green and orange lines. The black dotted line is the forecast from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA WEO 2012). Numbers are believed to be gross exports from the production installations and thus not adjusted for “shrinkage” from Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) extraction, primarily at Kollsnes and Kårstø. The NGL extraction reduces total sales gas volumes with around 4% relative to what is exported from the producing installations. Numbers in Gcm, Giga cubic meters (Gcm = Bcm; Billion cubic meters)

Figure 1: The chart above shows development in natural gas exports from production installations on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) as reported by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) from 1996 to 2015 and with my forecast for delivery potential towards 2025.
The chart also shows the band of NPD forecasts; green line upper projection, orange line lower projection. NPD’s central projection is in about the middle of the green and orange lines.
The black dotted line is the forecast from the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2012 (IEA WEO 2012).
Numbers are believed to be gross exports from the production installations and thus not adjusted for “shrinkage” from Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) extraction, primarily at Kollsnes and Kårstø. The NGL extraction reduces total sales gas volumes with around 4% relative to what is exported from the producing installations.
Numbers in Gcm, Giga cubic meters (Gcm = Bcm; Billion cubic meters)

My forecast  and NPD’s forecast at end 2015 are basically identical towards the end of this decade, but differs about the timing for the start of the decline and how steep this will become as from early next decade. My forecast is also tested versus the Reserves over Production (R/P) ratio as of end 2015, refer also figure 2.

At end 2015 the NPD projection of Norwegian natural gas supply potential towards 2025 was revised down.

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The Bakken, a little about EUR and R/P

In this post I present some of the methods I have used to get estimates based on actual NDIC data on the Estimated Ultimate Recovery (EUR) for wells in the Bakken North Dakota.

The Bakken is here being treated as one big entity. As the Bakken shales [for geological reasons] are not ubiquitous there will be differences amongst pools, formations and companies.

One metric to evaluate the efficiency of a Light Tight Oil (LTO) well and a large population of wells are looking at developments in the Reserves over Production (R/P) ratio.

The R/P ratio is a snapshot that gives a theoretical duration, normally expressed in years, the production level for one particular year can be sustained at with the reserves in production at the end of that year.

Further, as LTO wells decline steeply and a big portion of the total extraction has come/comes from wells started less than 2 years ago, this dominates the Reserves/Production (R/P) ratio. The flow from a big population of high flowing wells in steep decline results in a low R/P ratio (and vice versa).

The R/P metric says nothing about extraction in absolute terms, which is another metric that needs to be brought into consideration in order to obtain a more complete picture of expected developments.

Development in Well Totals by Categories

Figure 1: In the chart above the about 10,000 wells with 12 months of flow or more [started as of Jan-08 - Jul-15] has been split into 5 categories [ref the legend] and the average monthly flow versus total [for the average] has been plotted for each category. Cut off has been made after 72 months (6 years) as the declining number of wells over time makes the calculations susceptible to noise like from refracking in the tail and because of a declining well population. This method makes it possible to identify the EUR trajectories for each category of wells. The average well in the Bakken now follows a trajectory 2-4% below the green line [wells above 75 kbo and less than 100 kbo after the first 12 months of flow]. The colored dotted lines [sloping upwards to the right] connects each category after the first 12, 24, 36, etc months of flow.

Figure 1: In the chart above the about 10,000 wells with 12 months of flow or more [started as of Jan-08 – Jul-15] has been split into 5 categories [ref the legend] and the average monthly flow versus total [for the average] has been plotted for each category. Cut off has been made after 72 months (6 years) as the declining number of wells over time makes the calculations susceptible to noise like from refracking in the tail and because of a declining well population.
This method makes it possible to identify the EUR trajectories for each category of wells. The average well in the Bakken now follows a trajectory 2-4% below the green line [wells above 75 kbo and less than 100 kbo after the first 12 months of flow].
The colored dotted lines [sloping upwards to the right] connects each category after the first 12, 24, 36, etc months of flow.

The average Bakken well is now estimated to reach a EUR of 320 kbo [kbo; kilo barrels oil = 1,000 bo]. Based on this, the average well has an R/P of 2.7 after its first year of flow, which suggests that about 27% of its EUR is recovered during its first year of flow.

Estimates done by others based on actual NDIC data puts now the EUR for the average Bakken well slightly below 300 kbo.

As from what point the wells reach the end of their economic life, educated guesses now spans from 10 bo/d (0.3 kbo/Month) to 25 bo/d (0.75 kbo/Month).

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Written by Rune Likvern

Sunday, 21 August, 2016 at 20:13

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